Hume and the External World by Rocknak, Stefanie
1 
 
Hume and the External World 
Stefanie Rocknak 
Hartwick College 
 
§ 1 Introduction 
Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he 
occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? 
Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense 
data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we 
have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them?  
Contrary to the “rationalist” tradition from which Hume was emerging, Hume thought that 
our only access to the world was by way of the data that we receive from our five senses, i.e. what 
he called sense “impressions.” Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, Hume thought that we cannot use 
anything like “pure rational thought”—  i.e. thought devoid of sense data—to grasp or understand 
the world. This methodology constitutes Hume’s “naturalistic” or scientific approach: because we 
do not have access to anything beyond our sense impressions (and any ideas that are caused by 
them), “reality” can only be defined in terms of impressions and ideas. According to Hume, ideas 
and impressions constitute the only fabric of “reality” that we have access to and that we know. 
Though a reality or “external world” might, or could exist beyond our impressions and ideas Hume 
believed we have no way of telling, one way or the other. 
To some degree, this reading of Hume aligns with what some scholars have characterized 
as Hume’s “phenomenonalist” reading of the external world. According to this interpretation, 
objects are just sense impressions, i.e. they are literally what we feel, see, touch, taste or hear.1 In 
this case an object such as an “apple,” would literally be how the apple tastes, feels, smells, etc.  
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The phenomenonalist position competes with three other major interpretations of Humean 
objects. Some scholars have argued that according to Hume, objects are “intentional,” i.e. they are 
the objects of thought (Salmon 1983). In this case, an object, e.g. an “apple” would be an idea that 
we necessarily think about. Still others interpret Hume as a realist, i.e. objects are mind-
independent.2  In this case, an “apple” would be a thing that exists independently of how we sense 
it, or think about it. And finally, some think that Hume maintained that objects are imagined ideas, 
but they are not imagined to be the causes of our perceptions.3  In this case, the object “apple” 
would be an imagined idea, but we do not also imagine that it causes our sense impressions of it.  
Clearly then, much is at stake in regard to how one interprets Hume’s conception of an 
“object.” Doing so directly affects how one understands Hume’s notion of a “world” that may or 
may not exist “externally” to the human mind. For as just noted, some scholars claim that Hume 
thought that objects, and so, the external world, consists of just sense impressions (i.e. the 
phenomenonalist position), while in other cases, it seems that Hume thought that objects and the 
external world are just the objects of our thought (i.e. the intentional position). Meanwhile, the 
realists interpret Hume as believing in a mind-independent world, i.e. a truly external world, while 
others thought that external world is, to some degree, imagined (i.e. the imagined but non-causal 
interpretation). 
However, although Hume occasionally uses the word ‘object’ in a phenomenonalist, 
intentional, realist and/or imagined but not causal sense, his position on objects, his position on 
the “external world,” is not effectively captured by any of these scholarly interpretations. Thus, in 
this paper, focusing primarily on Book I of the Treatise,4 I present an overview of a fifth, more 
complicated, and I think, more accurate interpretation of Hume’s notion of objects.  
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In particular, I suggest that we must distinguish between: a.) Hume’s conception of the 
“vulgar” notion of objects (which may be equated with the “phenomenonalist” reading of Hume, 
noted above), b.) Hume’s conception of the “philosophical” position on objects and c.) Hume’s 
own position on objects. In all three cases, we do, indeed, imagine ideas of objects. Thus, we will 
see that that regardless if we are in a vulgar, philosophical or Humean state of mind, Hume thought 
that we imagine the external world.5 As a result, as already suggested above, Hume was by no 
means a realist, and so, we can immediately rule out the realist interpretation. How the other three 
scholarly interpretations sketched above relate to my reading will be explained as we proceed. 
In the meantime, we must immediately call our attention to three fundamental differences 
between the vulgar position, the philosopher’s position and Hume’s position: 1.) The vulgar 
imagine that objects are identical to impressions. 2.) The philosophers, in virtue of making a 
reasoned rejection of the vulgar position, imagine that objects are mind independent and are the 
causes of our perceptions. However, they are unaware that they are imagining objects. Instead, 
they think that reason, and reason alone, shows that objects exist as mind-independent entities. 3.) 
Hume thinks that we always imagine that objects are the “invariable and uninterrupted”6 causes of 
our perceptions; this is a condition of possibility for almost all thought, including our ability to 
reason. 
In this very general respect, we may refer to this third position that I am identifying as 
Hume’s position, as a transcendental conception of objects. Accordingly, all humans must, in order 
to function properly, almost immediately imagine invariable and uninterrupted objects—i.e. 
objects that admit of what he calls a “perfect identity.” Thus, this process must occur before we 
employ any kind of reasoning regarding what we believe are uninterrupted and invariable objects. 
And so, this transcendental process must take place well before the philosopher can use reason to 
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reject the vulgar position and subsequently imagine that objects are mind-independent objects; the 
transcendental process is a condition of possibility for the philosophical process—it is what some 
might refer to as “pre-theoretical” (c.f. (Mounce 1999), (Pears 1990)).7  
To illustrate the general distinctions between 1.) The vulgar position 2.) The philosophical 
position and 3.) Hume’s position,  I have divided this paper as follows: In §2, I give a general 
overview of  “perfect identity,” since it frames all of Hume’s discussions of objects in the Treatise, 
regardless if he is discussing his own position, the vulgar view, or the philosophical position. In 
§3, I provide a general explanation of the relationship between the following two pairs of 
properties:  uninterruptedness and invariability v. continuity and distinctness. In §4, I summarize 
the vulgar position on objects. In §5, I summarize the philosophical conception of objects. In §6, 
I summarize the transcendental conception of objects which what I take to be Hume’s own position 
on objects. In §7 I summarize the distinction between natural and philosophical causation and in 
§8 I summarize transcendental causation. Finally, in §9, I present my conclusion. 
 
§2 Perfect Identity: A Summary 
Hume introduces what he calls “perfect identity” in the Treatise section “Of Skepticism with 
regard to the senses,” which culminates in the statement that the two essential properties of identity 
are invariability and uninterruptedness (T 1.4.2.30; SBN 199-201).  Hume repeats this claim in 
“Of personal identity” (T 1.4.6.6; SBN 253-5). According to Hume, “perfect identity” is the 
paradigmatic definition of how he thinks we conceive of identity—it allows us to determine how 
and when an “object” may be characterized as such, e.g. how and when is a “chair” actually a 
“chair”?  
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Moreover, it is ideas that admit of perfect identity, not impressions, and not mind-
independent objects (“Of Skepticism with regard to the senses,” i.e. T 1.4.2.29; SBN 200-1 and 
“Of personal identity,” i.e. 1.4.6.6; SBN 253). Also, Hume tells us in “Of skepticism with regard 
to the senses” and “Of personal identity” that the properties of invariability and uninterruptedness 
are imagined.8 This is the case because, according to Hume, our perceptions, by their very nature, 
are never invariable and/or uninterrupted. And thus, neither impressions nor any idea that exactly 
represents9 an impression could be invariable and uninterrupted. However, impressions and ideas 
may surely resemble each other to a very high degree, and thus, they do admit of a certain kind of 
“constancy” (T 1.4.2.18; SBN 194–5). However, this kind of constancy (resemblance) is not 
invariability, although, confusingly enough, Hume also uses the word ‘constant’ to mean 
“invariable,” especially when claiming that we never experience invariable and uninterrupted 
impressions.10 
Regardless of this confusion regarding the word ‘constant’—i.e. in some cases it means 
“resembling,” and in other cases, it means “invariable”—Hume makes it abundantly clear that 
although we can perceive a high degree of resemblance among our impressions and any idea or 
ideas that exactly represents them, we never perceive them to be uninterrupted and/or invariable, 
unless we imagine them to be so.11 
According to Hume, when we imagine that something has a perfect identity, we are 
imagining an idea of a thing, say a chair, that we think is uninterrupted. This means, in brief, that 
even if we stop having chair perceptions (e.g. by looking away), we imagine that the object “chair” 
does not become interrupted. Similarly, although our chair perceptions might vary, e.g. they shift 
with the changing light, we imagine that the object “chair” does not vary.   
 
§3 Invariability and Uninterruptedness v. Continuity and Distinctness 
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Throughout Book I, Hume seems to use the property of continuity interchangeably with the 
property of uninterruptedness. In some places, he speaks of imagining a continuous object (T 1.4.2; 
15-24; SBN 194-199), and in other places, he speaks of an uninterrupted object (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 
74). However, in both cases, he seems to mean the same thing: we are imagining an object that is 
not affected by the way in which we intermittently perceive it.  In other words, if an object is 
conceived of as uninterrupted, then it is, simply by definition, also conceived of as continuous; 
and vice versa; an uninterrupted “object” continues in the respect that its existence is not 
interrupted when we are not perceiving it. Likewise, an “object” that is not interrupted by our gaps 
in perceiving it, continues. Moreover, according to Hume, if an object is conceived of as 
continuous, it must also be conceived of as distinct. This also makes sense; for instance, if I believe 
that an “object,” say, a melon, continues to exist when I am not having impressions of it, then I 
must also believe that the melon exists distinctly from my perceptions—such that it is not affected 
when I stop perceiving it (T 1.4.2.2; SBN 187-8).  
However, although uninterruptedness and continuity are interchangeable, distinctness and 
invariability are not:  I could easily imagine an object existing distinctly from my perception of it, 
while simultaneously imagining that it varies, or changes, e.g. with time. Thus, we must conclude 
that the two pairs of properties, i.e. continuity and distinctness v. uninterruptedness and 
invariability are not strictly interchangeable. 
Throughout Book I of the Treatise, Hume alternates between talking about imagining 
continuous and distinct objects v. imagining uninterrupted and invariable objects. It is entirely 
plausible that Hume switches from discussing objects that we imagine to be continuous and distinct 
to objects that we think are uninterrupted and invariable in order to introduce the notion of “time.” 
In particular, in “The same subject continu’d” and in “Of skepticism with regard to the senses,” he 
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explains how “time”—which in one respect is an imagined object12—can change or vary the 
perceptions of those things that we imagine to be otherwise uninterrupted and invariable (T 
1.2.5.29; SBN 65, 1.4.2.29; SBN 200-1). With this caveat in mind, we will use the two pairs of 
imagined properties interchangeably. 
 
§4 The Vulgar Conception of Objects 
Hume explains in “Of skepticism with regard to the senses” that the “vulgar,” or everyday 
person—which includes all of us at least some of the time—is consistently fooled into thinking 
that certain resembling sense-impressions may be identified with each other (T 1.4.2.36, 38; SBN 
205, 207). As a result of doing so, we tend to think that sets of resembling perceptions constitute 
the objects of the world. For example, If I look at, say, a bicycle, at time T1, and then again at time 
T2, and still again at time T3-Tn, my current sense perceptions and my past impressions of the 
bicycle would all seem to significantly resemble each other. In this respect, they are “constant” but 
not invariable. However, the vulgar mistake this constancy for invariability, and so, they are led to 
imagine an idea of an “invariable” object (“Of skepticism with regard to the senses,” i.e. T 1.4.2.31; 
SBN 201-2). 
Through a very complex process involving dispositions (states of mind) and the 
imagination, the vulgar proceed to imagine an idea of a sense impression that they think is not only 
invariable, but also, is uninterrupted (T 1.4.2.31-35; SBN 201-4). However, the vulgar ultimately 
reject this position because it becomes clear to them that they cannot simultaneously believe that 
a perception is both interrupted and not interrupted (T 1.4.2.36; SBN 205). In turn, they posit the 
existence of an uninterrupted and invariable unperceived perception (i.e. an unperceived 
impression (T 1.4.2.37-40; SBN 205-8)).13 However, the “philosophers” proceed to make short 
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work of the idea of an unperceived perception, i.e. they summarily reject it by using simple logic 
(modus tollens) and a thought experiment (T 1.4.2.45; SBN 210-11).14  
In sum, the vulgar a.) think that objects are impressions b.) they are initially inclined to 
imagine that impressions are uninterrupted and invariable thanks to resembling dispositions (states 
of mind) and c.) upon rejecting this conception of objects they posit the existence of an unperceived 
perception. d.) The first phase of the vulgar position (i.e. b.) above) is rejected by the vulgar 
themselves and the second phase, (i.e. c.) above is rejected by the philosophers.   
In all cases, the vulgar imagine that they are thinking of an object with a perfect identity, 
but they are not because, as noted above, they cannot effectively imagine the property of 
uninterruptedness.15 Not surprisingly, in “Of personal identity,” Hume explicitly refers to the 
vulgar position on objects as “improper” (T 1.4.6.7; SBN 255). As such, it is an instance of 
“imperfect identity” (T 1.4.6.9; SBN 256; emphasis added). 
At this point, it should be clear that the vulgar position clearly captures the “phenomenalist” 
position sketched in the Introduction to this paper, where, it is alleged, Hume identified objects 
with impressions. However, as we will see, Hume’s conception of objects, and so, his conception 
of the external world, is surely not to be confused with the vulgar position. For one thing, as noted 
above, he clearly must reject the vulgar position; it does not allow for an effective conception of 
perfect identity, it is “improper” and “imperfect.” Secondly, and most importantly, he presents an 
entirely different psychological process of imagining ideas of objects that, as such, a.) cannot be 
conflated with either the vulgar or the philosophical process and b.) is never explicitly rejected by 
Hume.16  Thus, Hume was not a “phenomenalist” when it came to the external world. He did not 
simply identify objects with sense impressions.   
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§5 The Philosophical Conception of Objects 
As already noted above, the philosophical position emerges as a result of rejecting the vulgar 
position, particularly the second phase of vulgar thought, i.e. the idea of an “unperceived 
perception.” More specifically, according to Hume, the philosophers conclude that reason (and 
reason alone) shows that the vulgar perspective of objects is false. Concomitantly, it seems that 
reason (and reason alone) shows that there must be mind-independent objects; particularly objects 
that are the continued and distinct causes of our perceptions (T 1.4.2.46; SBN 211).17 
However, Hume explains, although the philosophers think that reason is solely responsible 
for proving that mind-independent objects exist, this is not entirely accurate. Rather, Hume argues, 
in conjunction with their reasoned rejection of the vulgar conception of objects, the philosophers 
must inevitably employ the imagination; philosophers are actually imagining ideas of continued 
and distinct objects that, as such, allegedly cause our interrupted and varied perceptions of them 
(T 1.4.2.49-50; SBN 213). In this respect, he explains in “Of skepticism with regard to the senses” 
that the philosophical conception of objects is the “monstrous offspring” of reason and the 
imagination (T 1.4.2.52; SBN 215).  
Hume’s first extended account of the philosophical position on objects occurs at the end of 
the section “Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” where he discusses the philosopher’s 
rejection of the vulgar perspective (T 1.4.2.43-53; SBN 209-16). Hume’s second extended account 
occurs in the course of discussing three variants of the philosophical conception of objects, namely, 
the ancient conception of objects (“Of the antient philosophy,” i.e. T 1.4.3.1-11; SBN 219-225), 
the modern conception of objects (“Of the modern philosophy,” i.e. T 1.4.4.1-15; SBN 225-231) 
and the notion of an immaterial soul (“Of the immateriality of the soul,” i.e. T 1.4.5.1-35; SBN 
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232-251). Hume’s final extended account of the philosophical position on objects occurs in the 
course of discussing personal identity in 1.4.6, i.e. “Of personal identity.”   
 
§6 The Transcendental Conception of Objects 
There are three moments in Book I of the Treatise where Hume discusses a process of imagining 
ideas of objects that is clearly distinct from the way in which the vulgar and the philosophers 
respectively imagine ideas of objects. These occur in: 1.) “Of probability; and of the idea of cause 
and effect.” (T 1.3.2.1-2; SBN 73-4), where Hume discusses “secret causes,” 2.) “Of skepticism 
with regard to the senses,” (T 1.4.2.15-24; SBN 194-199) which occurs in the course of a 
discussion of the role that the two levels of constancy and coherence of our impressions play in 
regard to our conception of objects and 3.) “Of skepticism with regard to the senses,” (T 1.4.2.25-
30; SBN 199-201) which constitutes part 1 of 1.4.2’s four part system, where Hume presents his 
“principium individuationis,” i.e. the principle of identity.18 These three moments provide the 
textual evidence for my transcendental interpretation of objects. 
 In particular, in the second moment (T 1.4.2.15-24; SBN 194-199) we must imagine an 
idea of an object that we think represents the properties of continuity and distinctness, while in the 
two other cases (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73-4, T 1.4.2.25-30; SBN 199-201), we must imagine an idea of 
an object that we think represents the properties of invariability and uninterruptedness (where, as 
noted above, for our purposes, we may assume that invariability and uninterruptedness are roughly 
interchangeable with the properties of continuity and distinctness). This means that according to 
Hume, particular objects that seem to admit of what he calls a “perfect identity” are imagined, 
complex ideas. 
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Moreover, ideas of objects that we think admit of a perfect identity appear to be very similar 
to abstract ideas. However, these ideas represent particular objects, not general objects. To 
understand why this is the case—at least in broad terms—recall that Hume, similar to Berkeley, 
defines an abstract object as follows: “all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to 
a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon 
occasion other individuals, which are similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1; SBN 17). According to Hume, 
a general idea is actually a particular idea with a “certain term” attached to it. For instance, upon 
experiencing a set of resembling ideas of “objects” (say, of dogs), we generally call them by the 
same name, regardless of any small variations (T 1.1.7.7; SBN 20). Afterwards, whenever we hear 
the name “dog,” we call to mind one of the particular ideas of the set which “revives the idea of 
one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances 
and properties” (T 1.1.7.7; SBN 20). This means that a particular idea not only represents a 
particular impression, but the entire “revival set” (Garrett 1997: 53). However, it does not exactly 
represent the entire revival set since “the word not being able to revive the idea of all these 
individuals, only touches the soul, if I may be allow’d so to speak, and revives that custom, which 
we have acquir’d by surveying them” (T 1.1.7.7; SBN 20). Thus, our idea of a dog (in general) 
brings to mind a great deal of what we have experienced upon perceiving dogs, but not everything. 
When we think of a dog, in general, we bring to mind the idea of a particular dog that we have had 
an impression of, but now augmented with an imagined compilation of other dog perceptions.  
Hume has a very similar process in mind in the three sets of passages noted above regarding 
particular objects. More specifically, we must first experience respectively, a “species” (T 1.3.2.2; 
SBN 74) or a number of “constant and coherent” perceptions (T 1.4.2.15-24; SBN 194-9) or a 
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“number” of “resembling” perceptions (T 1.4.2.27; SBN 200). Following, we imagine a “secret 
cause” (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 74) of this set of resembling perceptions, which is explained below. 
In particular, we imagine an object that we think is invariable and uninterrupted (or 
continuous and distinct). To do so, we imagine that one of the perceptions from the set of 
resembling perceptions is a.) the cause of that set and b.) it is invariable and uninterrupted (or 
continuous and distinct). In other words, we imagine that it has a perfect identity. As such, as in 
the case with a general, abstract idea, we use a particular perception from a revival set, i.e. the 
“species” or “number” to represent the whole set. However, this particular perception does not 
exactly represent any impression because it has certain imagined qualities, particularly: a.) we 
imagine that it is invariable and uninterrupted (or continuous and distinct), where, recall, we never 
perceive any of these qualities. In precisely this respect, it is a “secret cause;” we do not “see or 
feel” it (T 1.3.2.3; SBN 74). And b.) we imagine it to be a cause, where we never perceive it to be 
what Hume refers to as “constantly conjoined” with the perceptions that we imagine that it causes 
(T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92). This is the case because, as just noted, we never “see or feel” it, so we cannot 
perceive it, much less perceive it as being constantly conjoined with another perception.  
For instance, although our idea of a particular chair object would be based on a particular 
chair impression that we have actually had, we must imagine that this idea is not only invariable 
and uninterrupted (or continuous and distinct), but that it is the cause of any perception that 
resembles it, i.e. the set of our resembling (but invariable and interrupted) chair perceptions. And 
thus, Hume explains, our imagined idea of an object that admits of perfect identity is “oblique[ly]” 
and “indirect[ly]” related to our experience (T 1.4.2.21; SBN 197), precisely because it does not 
exactly represent an impression. However, it is based on an impression; in particular, it belongs to 
the “species” noted above, but with imagined qualities.19   
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Moreover, our ability to imagine such causes seems to be presupposed by, at least, our 
ability to employ what Hume calls philosophical causation. And thus, this process is fundamentally 
distinct from the philosophical process of imagining causes, which, recall, only occurs by way of 
rejecting the vulgar position, a rejection that necessarily incurs the use of, at least, philosophical 
probable reasoning. To understand why this is the case—at least in general terms—we need to 
briefly examine i.) The distinction between “natural” and “philosophical” causation and ii.) The 
way in which we imagine a “secret cause.” 
 
§7 Natural Causation v. Philosophical Causation: A Brief Overview 
For our purposes, we can distinguish between what Hume refers to as the “natural” and 
“philosophical” relations of causality as follows: The natural relation of causality is the product of 
a conditioning process (specifically, the repetitive association of impressions [T 1.3.14; SBN 155-
72]). In this respect, the natural relation of causality is reflexive, not reflective. Indeed, this is what 
the negative argument concerning induction is meant to show: the natural relation of causality is 
not a reasoning (comparing) process,20 nor is it justified by any reasoning process or reasons. 
Philosophical relations of causality however, are not mere reflexes. Rather, after we have become 
conditioned to think in terms of natural relations of causality, we use “reason”—i.e. a comparing 
process—to determine if two objects are causally related (T 1.1.5.1–2; SBN 13–14, T 1.3.6.12–
16; SBN 92–93, T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169–170).21  
Consider the following example: One may become conditioned through “constant 
conjunction” (T 1.1.1.8; SBN 4) to think that fire causes paper to burn. And so, every time she 
sees fire engulfing paper (or remembers fire engulfing paper), the enlivened idea of paper burning 
reflexively comes to mind. Thus, according to one of Hume’s many senses of belief,22 she believes 
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that the paper will burn; indeed, the enlivened idea is the belief (T 1.3.7.5-6; SBN 96). This is what 
we may think of as a causally-produced belief; it occurs as the result of a conditioning process, 
which comprises the natural relation of causality. However, as a result of reflection, i.e. “reason,” 
she may also come to believe the causal relation that “every time fire engulfs paper, it will burn.” 
In this respect, a causal relation is, in effect, a “principle;” it is a causal relation that we believe to 
obtain between “fire,” i.e. the cause, and “paper burning,” i.e. the effect. Thus, we may refer to 
this kind of belief, and, in fact, any kind of belief that is based on the comparison of a cause and 
an effect as a philosophical probable belief. As such, philosophical probable belief is a result of 
reason, not a conditioning process. We can call this reasoning process “philosophical probable 
reason.” 
In order to engage in philosophical probable reason, we must, it seems, be able to explicitly 
distinguish between the cause and the effect, e.g. we must be able to distinguish “fire” from “paper 
burning.” We must also be able to distinguish these causes and effects from ourselves, or at least, 
we must be capable of thinking of these things as existing independently from our perceptions of 
them. Otherwise, it seems, our situation would be hopelessly complicated; e.g. if we thought that 
both “fire” and “paper burning” were actually parts of ourselves, then the fire would not actually 
cause the “paper” to burn. Rather, somehow, we would be “causing” a part of ourselves to “burn.”  
In other words, we would lack what Bennett calls “objectivity concepts” (1971: 324); concepts 
that Bennett disparages Hume for not employing in the Treatise.23  
However, it seems that such “objectivity concepts” need not be in place when it comes to 
thinking in terms of natural causation, e.g. whenever we have an impression of fire engulfing 
paper, we automatically and reflexively think of paper burning, without necessarily thinking of 
these perceptions as being distinct from ourselves. Moreover, we don’t even reflectively 
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distinguish these ideas from each other, we are just compelled to think of one whenever we have 
the impression of the other one. Thus, although Hume does not explicitly say as much, this seems 
to be another aspect of the distinction between natural and philosophical causation: the former 
does not, it seems, necessarily invoke objectivity concepts, while the latter does.24 
 
 
§8 Transcendental Causation 
At this point, we may consider, in bit more detail, the process behind imagining “secret causes.” 
Doing so will show us how this process is fundamentally different from the process where, by way 
of a reasoned reaction to the vulgar, the philosophers imagine that objects are the causes of our 
perceptions. 
 Recall that Hume explains in the first passage pertaining to what I call transcendental 
causation that we must move “beyond the impressions of the senses” to imagine a “secret cause” 
such that in turn, we are better able to make comparisons (i.e. reason about) objects that admit of 
a perfect identity (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73-4). In particular, as explained earlier, we experience a set of 
resembling impressions that we imagine are caused by an object with a perfect identity. Thus we 
are thinking in terms of some kind of causal inference; particularly, one that associates a set of 
resembling impressions with an idea (i.e. an imagined cause). 
Indeed, Hume tells us in the second portion of text pertaining to transcendental causation—
found in “Of skepticism with regard to the senses”—that this is a very special “kind of … 
causation” (T 1.4.2.19; SBN 195)) which, in virtue of being “considerably different” (T 1.4.2.21; 
SBN 197) from other kinds of causation, enables us to imagine an “insensible” (T 1.4.2.21; SBN 
198) idea of an object that admits of a perfect identity. In particular, Hume explains, before we 
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imagine their respective and “insensible” causes, our perceptions appear to us as “loose[ly]” 
(1.4.2.22; SBN 198) and “irregular[ly]” (T 1.4.2.21; SBN 197) “constant and coherent” (T 
1.4.2.20; SBN 195).  However, once we imagine that an object with perfect identity is causing 
such perceptions, the constancy and coherence of our perceptions appears more “regular,” 
“compleat” and “uniform” (T 1.4.2.22; SBN 198). Hume explains that this phenomenon is 
somewhat analogous to the way in which we might imagine a “correct and exact” standard of 
equality when doing mathematics. This standard is based on the “loose” notions of equality that 
we actually perceive. In virtue of imagining an exact standard, it makes what we actually perceive, 
i.e. our “loose standards” (T 1.4.2.22; SBN 198), seem more precise. Moreover, imagining such 
causes enables us to coherently think in terms of ordinary (i.e. non transcendental) causal 
relationships which obtain between objects that do admit of a perfect identity (T 1.4.2.20; SBN 
196).25 
In the third portion of text pertaining to transcendental causation—also found in “Of 
skepticism with regard to the senses”—Hume explains how we imagine the object “time” as a 
cause of change, similar to how we imagine objects that admit of perfect identity to cause sets of 
resembling perceptions. Doing so, very generally speaking, allows Hume to explain how we might 
imagine ideas of objects with perfect identities that persist in “time,” although our perceptions of 
such objects change, i.e., vary with “time.” Thus, in order to even think of anything as occurring 
in “time,” we must first imagine time as a cause, and, more complicated still, imagine objects that 
admit of a perfect identity as persisting “in time.” Again, this is a very special “kind” of causation 
because the cause that we imagine is never perceived, regardless if it is the object “time” or the 
typical objects that we imagine to admit of a perfect identity, i.e. objects that we believe we have 
impressions of, e.g. tables, chairs, etc.  
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However, in all three cases, although it is abundantly clear that Hume thinks that this 
process involves some kind of inference, i.e. a special kind of causation, it does not, at least 
initially, seem to involve any kind of a comparison, or reasoning process. For like natural 
causation, this process seems to be almost reflexive, in the respect that upon experiencing a set of 
resembling perceptions, we are naturally and “always” and “almost universally” (T 1.4.2.29; SBN 
201) led to imagine an invariable and uninterrupted (or continuous and distinct) cause of those 
perceptions. Indeed, Hume writes just before discussing “secret causes” that: “we ought not to 
receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity” (T. 1.3.2.2; SBN 
73)  He also claims—in no uncertain terms—that we do not use “reason” to establish “the belief 
of objects independent of the mind,” as the philosophers mistakenly do. Rather, this belief is 
“entirely [owed] to the imagination.” (T 1.4.2.14; SBN 193) 
It is entirely plausible then, that, like natural causation, transcendental causation is a kind 
of inference, but it is reflexive—we don’t think about it, we just “universally” and “always” do it. 
However, like natural causation, it may eventually yield a comparison, i.e. what we might 
characterize as a kind of “philosophical” transcendental causation. For example, we may 
eventually compare what we take to be a mind-independent thing that causes our perceptions with 
the perceptions themselves; at this point we would be explicitly aware of our “objectivity 
concepts,” although we would not, it seems, be aware that we imagined them. Indeed, when such 
“objectivity concepts” are in place—i.e. when we are made aware of them via what we may 
characterize as transcendental philosophical reasoning—we may then, and only then, proceed to 
engage in philosophical probable reason, where we compare ideas of objects that we think are not 
only independent of each other, but are also independent of ourselves. Indeed, in order to use basic 
logic, e.g. the modus tollens that the philosophers use to refute the vulgar, we must be able to think 
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in terms of objectivity concepts and, at least, philosophical probable reasoning, where the later 
presupposes the former, as explained above. For how else could we think in terms of “if p then q” 
where we distinguish p and q not only from each other, but from ourselves, and in turn, think of 
“if p then q” as a principle, which, it seems, is derivative of the philosophical probable relation of 
“p causes q?”  
 Thus, the philosophers simply could not reject the vulgar without having objectivity 
concepts in place, i.e. without first imagining causes.  And thus, the philosophical position on the 
external world is fundamentally distinct from Hume’s transcendental account of the external 
world; the former presupposes the latter. 
 
§9 Conclusion 
We have seen that Hume thinks that we imagine objects, and so, we imagine the external world. 
Moreover, we have seen that the process described in what I call the three transcendental moments 
of Book I of the Treatise is fundamentally different from both the vulgar process of imagining 
objects and the philosophical process of imagining objects. In particular, the transcendental 
process differs from the vulgar process in the respect that 1.) The transcendental process does not 
assume that objects are impressions, while the vulgar process does. 2.) Rather, in the 
transcendental process, objects are imagined to be the causes of our interrupted and variable 
impressions 3.) Moreover, in the transcendental process, objects are effectively imagined to have 
a perfect identity, i.e. they are effectively imagined to be uninterrupted and invariable, or (roughly) 
equivalently, that they are continuous and distinct. However, Hume characterizes the vulgar 
conception of identity as “improper” and “imperfect” because the vulgar cannot effectively 
imagine the property of uninterruptedness (T 1.4.6.9; SBN 255-256). 
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Meanwhile, the transcendental process differs from the philosophical process of imagining 
objects in the respect that: 1.) In all three cases of the transcendental process, objects are not 
imagined as a result of a calculated, conscious rejection of the vulgar position, which, in turn, 
inspires a rather troublesome union between reason and the imagination. Rather, in all three cases, 
it seems clear that Hume was committed to a process that is a necessary condition of possibility 
for ordinary experience; this is something that, Hume claims, we must “always” “almost 
universally” and it seems, reflexively do (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 74, T 1.4.2.29; SBN 201). In particular, 
we must be able to effectively imagine ideas of invariable and uninterrupted objects such that we 
may, in turn, reason about objects; generally speaking, such ideas constitute what Bennett calls 
the missing “objectivity-concepts” (1971, 324) in Book I of the Treatise. Similarly, they constitute 
what Pears (1990) and Mounce (1999) would refer to as “pre-theoretical” aspects of the Treatise. 
2.) Moreover, in the case of the Ancient and Modern philosophical position on objects, as well as 
cases where philosophers imagine immaterial soul-objects, ideas of objects are not based on 
impressions (T 1.4.3-5; SBN 219-251). For instance, the Ancients’ idea of a “substance” is not 
based on any substance impression. In principle, it could not be; by definition, “substances” cannot 
be apprehended with our senses—they are, as Hume puts it, “invisible” (T 1.4.3.4; SBN 220). 
Similarly, Modern philosophers who believe in primary qualities and immaterial souls maintain 
that we never have an impression of either. As a result, Hume thinks that all of these philosophical 
conceptions of objects are utterly “incomprehensible” and smack of the “occult” (T 1.4.3.8; SBN 
222). However, in the three instances where Hume discusses the transcendental account of objects, 
the ideas that we imagine are not incomprehensible. Rather, they are based on impressions, 
specifically sets, or what Hume refers to as “species” of “perfectly resembling” but interrupted 
perceptions (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 74). 
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Finally, we might conclude that in a very general respect, Hume anticipated Immanuel 
Kant’s later work in the Critique of Pure Reason, written approximately forty years after Hume’s 
Treatise. There, Kant presented a complicated and lengthy account of transcendental conditions, 
including “objectivity concepts.” Thus, in many respects, both Hume and Kant influenced the field 
of what we currently call “psychology;” both philosophers were deeply concerned with 
understanding how the human mind works, especially in regard to how it allows us articulate what 
we think is the “external world.” 
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